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chapter 7
Partial ExPlanations  
in social sciEncE
Robert Northcott
7.1. introduction
How much was the increased murder rate explained by higher unemployment? 
What was the main cause of the American Civil War? Was it the penetrating offense 
or the stout defense that was most responsible for the football team’s victory? It is 
ubiquitous in social science and indeed everyday life that the causes we have iden-
tified explain some but not all of an outcome. In such cases, the question of critical 
interest is to quantify each cause’s contribution to the outcome. The focus is not on 
how general or deep or transportable a particular explanation or mechanism is, 
important though those concerns may also be, but rather is narrowly on how much 
a cause explains an effect in a particular one-off case. This is relevant historically to 
determine which factors explained an outcome most. It is also relevant as a guide to 
future intervention—which factors would influence an outcome most?
Comparing different causes’ importance, and apportioning responsibility 
between them, requires making good sense of the notion of partial explanation, that 
is, of degree of explanation. This turns out to be a delicate task.1 The vast literature 
on defining causation itself is of no direct help because in the cases of interest here 
typically all parties already agree on what causes are present. The issue at hand is, 
rather, degree of causation, which is clearly distinct from mere causation simpliciter. 
It turns out to be very useful to make our concepts in this area explicit. What do 
partial explanations amount to, and, thus, what constitutes good evidence for them? 
How much is degree of causation subjective, how much objective? If the causes in 
question are probabilistic, how much is the outcome due to them and how much to 
simple chance? What is the role of contrasts?
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This chapter is split into four sections. Throughout, the emphasis will be pri-
marily conceptual rather than epistemological. I begin by formulating the notion of 
degree of causation, or effect size. One particular understanding of this is standard 
across many sciences, and I relate it to influential recent work in the literature on 
causation. I use this understanding as the basis for my understanding in turn of 
partial explanation. In the second section, I examine to what extent mainstream 
social science methods—both quantitative and qualitative—succeed in establish-
ing effect sizes so understood. The answer turns out to be, roughly: only to some 
extent. Next, the standard understanding of effect size, even though widespread, 
still has several underappreciated consequences. In the third section, I detail some 
of those. Finally, in the fourth section, I discuss the separate issue of explanandum-
dependence, which is essential to assessing any cause’s explanatory importance and 
yet which has been comparatively neglected.
7.2. Degree of causation
Let X be a cause variable and Y an effect variable. Y is a function of the state of the 
world, that is of X and W, where W is background conditions (i.e., formally a set 
of variables representing the state of the world just excluding X).2 Let xA denote 
the actual value of X, and xC the salient counterfactual value of X. And let yA and 
yC denote the values that Y takes given xA and xC respectively (given actual back-
ground conditions).3 Then define a causal effect (or, equivalently, the effect size or 
strength or importance) of a cause variable X with respect to an effect variable Y, 
to be:
A Cy  – y  [1]
Formula [1] is quite intuitive—in words, it is how much difference X made. Glossing 
over various technical details, we are interested in the quantity of effect for which xA 
is responsible, and this is just the level of effect with xA compared to the level with 
some alternative input xC. For example, the causal strength (‘CS’) of kicking a ball 
might be yielded by the ball’s acceleration with the kick compared to its acceleration 
without that kick.4 A negative CS here would correspond to accelerating the ball 
backward; a zero CS to leaving its acceleration unchanged. The units of a CS are 
whatever units are used to measure Y. At the heart of [1] is that it captures a con-
trolled-experiment sensibility. We want to compare the level of effect with and with-
out the cause while keeping all else equal. For instance, it would be no use comparing 
the acceleration of a ball with and without a kick if simultaneously a gust of wind 
had blown up, because obviously the calculation would then yield only the com-
bined impact of the two changes. For this reason, in [1] the background conditions 
must be constant across the two terms.5
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yC, the right-hand term in [1], is a counterfactual—we are interested in what the 
level of effect would have been, given xC and background conditions. How can this 
term be evaluated? Because, in reality, background conditions are never quite exactly 
the same from moment to moment, epistemologically the best we can ever do is find 
data from as good a re-creation of them as possible. In this respect, [1] serves as a 
normative ideal, guiding our treatment of actual data by telling us what hypothetical 
quantity is relevant to evaluating a CS. Only some actual data, namely those ade-
quately approximating controlled constant-W conditions, will then be appropriate.6
Once we know a given cause’s CS, we may compare it to the strengths of other 
causes. In this way, in principle we can compare several causes to see which of them 
are more responsible for a particular outcome. As is widely recognized, this notion 
of relative importance is choice-of-sample-specific. For example, a gas leak may be 
deemed a more important cause of a fire than is the presence of oxygen because of 
an implicit relativization to a normal population of cases. More particularly, relative 
to that normal population the unusual, difference-making feature is the gas leak not 
the oxygen. Formula [1] (and, later, formula [3]) captures this sensitivity via its ex-
plicit relativization to choice of contrasts. Change the salient contrast situation and 
you change which cause is fingered as having a large CS.7 (This reflects the highly 
context-sensitive nature of any CS—see section 3-1.)
Not surprisingly, [1] or something like it has a long history in several different 
literatures as a measure of degree of causation. In the philosophy of history, the 
motivation behind [1] is similar to that behind several classical views, for instance 
those in the nineteenth century of Yule and Weber (Turner 1986; Northcott 2008a). 
More recently, measures in psychology, psychiatry, epidemiology, law, and com-
puter science are also similar. Moreover, still other measures are closely related, 
being again essentially comparative of an effect with and without a cause.
There are many possible formulations for [1] other than a simple difference. 
Why not a ratio, for instance? But [1] is more flexible than might first appear; in 
particular, it may be calculated anew for any choice of Y-variable. So a concern with 
ratios, for instance, is readily accommodated by applying [1] to the logarithms of the 
original Y-variable. In this way, odds ratios too, for instance, are also causal strengths 
in the sense of [1]. Moreover, often we are interested in the variance rather than level 
of a variable (Braumoeller 2006); after suitable re-definition of Y, again [1] applies 
straightforwardly.
Within analytic philosophy, [1] reflects the common emphasis on causation’s 
difference-making aspect—a cause is something that makes a difference to its effect. 
Thus, naturally, the strength of a cause is how much difference it makes. The form of 
[1] can be incorporated into the contemporary Bayes net and causal modeling liter-
atures, and arguably is endorsed by experimental practice, at least in the case of 
quantitative variables (Woodward 2003; Pearl 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 
2000). More generally, it is also consistent with the mainstream literature on prob-
abilistic causation (Hitchcock 1996). Finally, it also represents the impact of a hypo-
thetical intervention, in particular one changing X from xA to xC, reflecting a close 
affinity with a manipulationist view of causation (Woodward 2003).
Partial Explanations in Social Science 133
OUP  UNCORRECTED PROOF
KINCAID-Chapter 07-PageProof 133 March 10, 2012 2:36 PM
Both terms in [1] can be interpreted as expected values. And the Y-variable may 
be a probability.8 In these ways, [1] accommodates the possibility of indeterminism. 
The indeterminism here is uncertainty regarding what effect results from a partic-
ular specification of cause and background conditions.9 In practice, such indeter-
minism is ubiquitous in social science; its accommodation is therefore essential for 
any definition of CS.
There are few alternative accounts of CS with any currency. In practice, much 
the most widespread in science are those derived from the analysis of variance and 
a range of related statistical techniques. But the many critiques of these techniques 
as instruments for assessing causal responsibility are by now familiar. For a sam-
pling, see Lewontin 1974; Shipley 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000; 
Northcott 2008b. Other alternatives will be discussed below, in particular regres-
sion coefficients and various nonprobabilistic qualitative definitions, as well as the 
apparent similarity between [1] and measures of average causal effect in statistics. 
Also, the final section below will discuss an issue—explanandum-dependence—
that does suggest [1] needs to be augmented.
7.3. causal strength and social  
scientific Practice
7.3.1.  two traditions
Two different methodological traditions have arisen within political science, which 
Mahoney and Goertz (2006) label “two cultures.” Analogous traditions exist in 
other social sciences too. These traditions are:
 
 1. Qualitative. This typically examines the causal structure behind only a small 
number of events, via detailed historical investigation. The structure is taken 
to apply to every event in the sample, thus allowing qualitative comparative 
analysis (‘QCA’). (Ragin 1987 is an especially influential advocate.) For 
example, what explains social revolution in agrarian-bureaucratic states that 
were not formally colonized (Skocpol 1979)? At the time of Skocpol’s work, 
this analysis applied to only three examples, namely the revolutions in France, 
Russia, and China. In Mahoney and Goertz’s phrase, the focus is on “causes of 
effects”—what is the detailed causal structure behind these particular events?
 2. Quantitative. This typically analyzes conditioned statistical associations 
over large samples, often by running regression analyses. For example, what 
is the influence of earnings and education on political participation? The 
focus is now on “effects of causes”—what is the average level of effect when 
a cause is present compared to when it is absent? King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994) are especially influential advocates of the quantitative approach.
 
Mechanisms, Explanation, and Causation134
OUP  UNCORRECTED PROOF
KINCAID-Chapter 07-PageProof 134 March 10, 2012 2:36 PM
I will focus on the specific issue of how each tradition furnishes us with partial 
explanations. That is, do their methods successfully yield us causal strengths?
7.3.2.  The qualitative approach
A theory in the QCA tradition may be summed up by a simple Boolean formula. 
Take, for instance, Moore’s (1966) theory of the development of early modern de-
mocracies. Expressed in Boolean terms:
Y = X & (A v B)
where Y = democracy, X = a strong bourgeoisie, A = alliance between bourgeoisie 
and aristocracy, B = weak aristocracy. In words, what was necessary for the develop-
ment of democracy was a strong bourgeoisie, together with an aristocracy neutered 
either by its own weakness or by alliance with the bourgeoisie.
There are several characteristic features to note:
 
 1. The theory offers a causal structure, not just a singular causal explanation, 
typically with multiple pathways to the same outcome.
 2. It is meant to apply to several cases.
 3. It is deterministic, couched in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
 
These features lead in turn to two noteworthy consequences: First, causal explana-
tions are provided of singular instances. The Boolean formula, assuming it is cor-
rect, provides in particular instances an appropriate invariance relation (Woodward 
2003)—that is, it licenses answers to the what-if-things-had-been-different ques-
tions characteristic of causal explanations. For example, given that there was a weak 
aristocracy, then the bourgeoisie being strong rather than weak explains why there 
was democracy rather than no democracy.
Second, however, it only enables us to calculate causal strengths, and thus par-
tial explanations, that are trivially all-or-nothing. For example, a strong bourgeoisie 
receives 100 percent credit because it is a necessary condition. According to formula 
[1], nontrivial causal strengths are possible in such cases only if the analysis is prob-
abilistic. But the qualitative approach, at least in its QCA version, is characteristi-
cally and explicitly nonprobabilistic.10 This unfortunately renders it inapplicable to 
the many explananda for which we do not have full explanations—that is, for which 
the causes we identify account for only some rather than all of the effect.
Aware of this limitation, several ingenious recent papers attempt to evade the 
second conclusion, and to define nontrivial causal strengths even within a frame-
work of deterministic necessary and sufficient conditions. I applaud this recogni-
tion of the problem. Although there is no space here to discuss them fully, I will very 
briefly outline some of these recent proposals before indicating why I think they are 
unsatisfactory substitutes for [1].
Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu (2009) present a definition based partly on set 
theory and partly on sequence analysis. If X is necessary for Y then on a Venn 
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diagram Y is a subset of X, and vice versa if X is sufficient. Matters of degree may 
then be incorporated via an implicit metric over the Venn diagram space. For 
instance, if X is a sufficient condition for Y, it may be more or less important depend-
ing on how much of set Y is filled by set X, that is, depending on the size of (Y – X) 
relative to X. Sequence analysis, roughly speaking, then traces the impact on such 
set-theoretic calculations of adding in new entries to the chain of causes leading up 
to the effect. In this way, a qualitative importance ranking can be defined over the 
different causes in the chain.
Despite its ingenuity, the Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu proposal has some 
weaknesses. Perhaps the most striking are two of scope. First, the authors them-
selves note that their scheme is able only to compare different causes on the same 
chain. It is therefore inapplicable to causes that are not themselves causally linked, 
that is, not to multiple independent or simultaneous causes. Second, there is a fur-
ther serious restriction of scope, namely inapplicability to quantitative explananda. 
By the latter, I do not mean here the large-sample regression analyses mentioned 
already. Rather, I have in mind singular cases where the effect of interest is not a 
simple all-or-nothing event, such as a revolution, but rather a quantitative variable. 
For instance, what explains the rise in average global temperature over the last few 
decades? This effect is a sample of one, but we will typically be interested in the 
quantitative contribution to it of various factors—how much did deforestation con-
tribute, how much did air travel, how much did volcanoes? Similar remarks apply to 
many other effects of interest, such as crime rates, voting shares, or economic 
growth indices.
In addition to these restrictions of scope, there are significant conceptual worries. 
Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu’s scheme requires a metric over Venn-diagram space, 
but is not clear either how to motivate such a metric or about the source of the par-
ticular universe of possibilities over which the sets range. Yet these issues are crucial 
to their scheme. Ultimately, they relate to choice of comparison population or, in the 
terms of [1], to choice of contrasts, and should be addressed explicitly. Finally, 
whereas [1] is easily interpreted as representing the result of an intervention, results 
from Mahoney, Kimball, and K. Koivu’s scheme—because framed  set-theoretically—
can only be interpreted as degrees of necessity or sufficiency. It thus cannot inform 
us precisely about the impact of a future or past hypothetical intervention. (This 
shortfall is related to the inapplicability to quantitative explananda.)
A second ingenious nonprobabilistic definition of CS for singular cases is due 
to Braham and Van Hees (2009). Much of their focus is on the relation between 
causal and moral/legal responsibility, but their measure is intended to apply to the 
former. They import tools from game theory and voting theory to define a cause’s 
strength to be, roughly speaking, the proportion of possible routes to the effect that 
include that particular cause. Unlike Mahoney et al’s, this new measure certainly 
can be applied to multiple independent causes. On the other hand, this gain is offset 
by it now no longer being clear that it can be applied to different causes on a single 
chain. ([1] can be applied in both circumstances.) More fundamentally, Braham and 
Van Hees’s approach suffers from the same shortfall as Mahoney et al’s, namely in 
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being inapplicable to quantitative effects.11 It also is subject to an analogous worry as 
before regarding interpretation of their results.
Ragin (2006) and Goertz (2006) present a third approach, framed in terms of 
fuzzy sets—that is, sets whose membership can be a matter of degree. For instance, 
a state might be deemed a democracy to degree 0.6. Naturally, this makes it much 
easier to define a nontrivial measure of CS even for the qualitative case, and more-
over a measure that is applicable to multiple independent causes. On the other 
hand, the particular measures endorsed by Ragin and Goertz seek to define one 
summary CS score for a whole population (see below for why this is problematic).
Goertz (2006) also analyzes CS in terms of actual frequencies. In particular, 
when considering the CS for a necessary condition in a particular one-off case, he 
appeals to a wider sample of analogous cases. For instance, suppose state break-
down is necessary for social revolution but only actually leads to it on 3 of 16 rele-
vant occasions (Goertz 2006, 92). Then, roughly speaking, it is assigned a CS of 3/16. 
Formula [1] appeals to probabilities; if those probabilities are interpreted as actual 
frequencies rather than single-case chances, then (assuming agreement on the rele-
vant sample) it would yield the same result as Goertz’s scheme (bracketing for now 
issues about background conditions). On the other hand, three worries: First, the 
actual-frequency approach leaves us vulnerable to actual samples that do not 
happen to proxy satisfactorily the counterfactuals relevant to CS. Second, Goertz’s 
scheme again seeks to define a single score for CS across a whole population of 
cases. And third, it seeks to combine into a single measure not only CS as under-
stood in this chapter but also what Goertz calls “trivialness”—by the latter Goertz 
has in mind something like gravity, which may be a necessary condition for revolu-
tion but, since it occurs in all relevant cases of nonrevolution too, is of only trivial 
interest and thus should have its CS downgraded. But, in line with philosophical 
consensus, my view is that such trivialness should lead merely to our pragmatic 
neglect of gravity rather than to a denial of its causal strength (see the references in 
note 7 for discussion).
Finally, none of these proposals speaks to the range of issues that [1] does. In 
particular, they address either incompletely or not at all the matters to be discussed 
in sections 3 and 4 below.
7.3.3.  The quantitative approach
I will focus on the relation between causal strength and regression coefficients. To 
keep the conceptual issues clear I will consider just the simplest case, that is, a re-
gression equation of the form:
Y = a + bX + e
where Y is the dependent variable, X the independent variable, a and b are constants, 
and e is an error term. For instance, perhaps Y = political participation, and X = earn-
ings. The relevant population will typically be large, for example, every adult citizen.
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The regression coefficient b is usually taken to represent the influence of X on 
Y. The central question is: Does it represent X’s causal strength?12 Start with the 
simple binary case where X only takes two values, as when a population is split into 
treatment and control groups. The coefficient b is then a measure of X’s causal effect, 
namely:
Y(X = 1)  Y(X = 0) [2]
where 1 and 0 are conventional values for treatment X being present or absent, and 
where the values for Y are averages across all the data points in the sample. Thus the 
quantitative tradition’s conception of causal effect, [2], is obviously analogous to the 
CS of [1], albeit now applying to particular populations of individuals rather than to 
those individuals themselves (on which more shortly).13
However, there is also one obvious and significant disanalogy between formulas 
[1] and [2], namely the issue of confounders. In particular, the right-hand term Y(X 
= 0) in the quantitative formula is derived from actual data. The hope is that these 
data serve as satisfactory proxies for the counterfactuals deemed relevant by [1], but 
there is no guarantee of that. In particular, they will not do so if there is too much 
causal heterogeneity within the population. For instance, suppose lack of education 
causes people both to be low-earners and also not to participate in politics. Then 
there will be a correlation between the latter two variables, reflected in a positive 
score in [2], even if there is no causal relation between them because the real work 
is all being done by lack of education. Formally, the background conditions are 
inconstant in such a way that the actual data from the X = 0 (“control”) group are 
not a good proxy for the counterfactual of what would have happened to the X = 1 
(“treatment”) group if the latter’s members had not received the treatment.
The problem of confounders is avoided by [1] because the right-hand term is a 
counterfactual relativized to constant W, precisely so as to avoid spurious correla-
tions and thus spurious CS scores. The problem is also addressed in the paradigm 
case of a randomized controlled trial, where all confounders are (at least on average) 
equally distributed between the treatment and control groups. But most regressions 
are run on observational rather than experimental data. Accordingly, in those cases 
there is no guarantee that [2] captures the size of a genuinely causal effect.
Of course, social scientists are long familiar with this issue and a huge literature 
has built up around how best to test for and avoid such confounding. (Morgan and 
Winship 2007 and Pearl 2000 are notable recent contributions.) Much boils down 
to sufficient knowledge of the underlying causal structure that is generating the 
data, as this in turn enables us to ensure there are no significant omitted variables, 
that the causal relations between the modeled variables are specified correctly, and 
so on. (Ultimately, there’s an analogous requirement in the qualitative case too.) In 
practice, much of the hard work in social science lies precisely in establishing this 
requisite knowledge. However, I will pass over the many details of that work here, in 
order to focus instead on a separate question: If good circumstances do prevail—
that is, if the regression equation is indeed a correct causal specification—are 
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regression coefficients good proxies for CS even then? For it turns out that even in 
such good cases, difficulties still remain.
First, a regression can only estimate a CS whose inputs the regression’s par-
ticular sample happens to proxy. For example, what if we wanted to know the CS 
of the actual treatment compared to a dosage outside the actual range? No data 
from the actual sample would proxy the relevant counterfactual; neither would 
the actual data alone license any extrapolation of the regression result to a new 
range of data.14 (Remember, most analyses are of observational, not experimental, 
data.)
Second, return temporarily to the case where X is binary, that is, where it only 
takes two values in the population. For Y = a + bX + e, the coefficient b may then be 
interpreted in either of two different ways:
 
 1. As a fixed constant, giving the CS that applies to the two values of X for 
every member of the population.
 2. As some average of the varied CS scores that apply to each individual 
member of the population.
 
These two options are often not distinguished but their implications are signifi-
cantly different. In particular, in the case of 2, the value of b does not directly bear 
on individual cases at all. Rather, it gives a CS only at the population level.
(In passing, a note on levels: In accordance with difference-making views of 
causation generally, formula [1] is not reductionist. That is, [1] may apply to X and 
Y variables at any level. In particular, X and Y may be population-level variables in 
which case a positive CS indicates a population-level cause, specific to the particular 
population sampled (and salient counterfactual population). Where there can be a 
problem is if background theory yields the causal structure only at the individual 
level, because then aggregation issues mean it may not be straightforward to infer 
the relevant causal structure at the population level—and without the latter, it is not 
possible to identify population-level causal strengths reliably. For instance, it is one 
thing to have in mind a mechanism for why an individual’s education might increase 
his or her level of political participation. But at the population level, what matters is 
how rates of education affect rates of political participation. Perhaps, for instance, 
after a while ever-higher rates of education no longer much increase rates of polit-
ical participation because of some macro-threshold effect. The point is that such a 
population-level mechanism could be invisible to the postulated individual-level 
mechanism, meaning that we did not have the population-level causal structure 
right, meaning in turn that we were unable to evaluate the counterfactuals necessary 
to any calculation of CS. In this chapter, though, I will again focus on conceptual 
rather than such epistemological issues.
Third, what if, as in the general case, the X-variable is interval-valued rather 
than binary? Then X may take any of a range of values, and the use of regression 
coefficients to estimate causal strengths becomes considerably more complicated. 
For such a population will contain within it many different causal strengths, corre-
sponding to different pairs of values of X. For instance, the data could be used to 
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estimate the CS of X = 2 rather than 1, or of 5 rather than 2, or of some mixture of 3 
and 1 rather than some mixture of 2 and 1 . . . and so on. Any regression coefficient 
gives just a single value for the population and so could only be a melange of these 
various possibilities.15,16
However, a regression equation can still be useful for calculating causal strengths 
sometimes. For in good cases it will represent accurately the underlying causal 
structure, and estimation of its coefficients will then enable particular causal 
strengths to be inferred, much as they can be inferred in physics if we know the 
relevant law. This may occasionally be especially straightforward. In particular, in 
the linear case, when X is a cause of Y, and when background conditions were not 
causally heterogeneous, the value of a regression coefficient will equal the average 
value of a “unit CS” in that population.17
Finally, there are several parallels with the qualitative case. In both tradi-
tions, causal strengths can be calculated only if the correct underlying causal 
structure has been identified. In the one case, this is done via detailed historical 
investigation, in the other via a mix of this or more abstract theory (in order to 
motivate the initial regression equation) combined with statistical analysis. 
Moreover if, against QCA practice, we interpreted qualitative analyses probabi-
listically, the resultant uncertainty would be analogous to the error term in a 
regression equation.18
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Figure 7.1 a line of best fit comparing any two data points generates a new cs each 
time. Many different causal strengths may thus be found within the same population.
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7.3.4.  recap
Qualitative analysis is certainly capable of delivering CS scores, assuming that the 
causal structure has been identified correctly. However, QCA’s deterministic empha-
sis purely on necessary and sufficient conditions means that these CS scores will 
only ever be trivially all-or-nothing.
In favorable circumstances, quantitative analysis too can estimate the correct 
causal structure, from which, in principle at least, nontrivial CS scores of interest 
can then be inferred. On the other hand, even in these favorable circumstances, the 
value of the regression coefficient itself will only rarely equal that of the CS of in-
terest. Moreover, the CS estimates will only ever be at the population; it is then a 
substantive further issue whether they apply also at the individual level.
7.4. Features of causal strength
7.4.1.  context-specificity
Although, as noted, formula [1] is ubiquitous across many sciences, nevertheless 
several of its implications are often unappreciated. Begin with a quick theoretical 
detour. According to [1], any CS value for a cause X is relativized to three things:
 
 1. the choice of effect variable Y
 2. background conditions (reflecting the levels of other causes of Y)
 3. the choice of contrast xC 
Regarding (1), for instance, kicking a ball may be a strong cause of the ball’s acceler-
ation but a weak cause of its changing color. Regarding (2), striking a match is a 
strong cause of light if background conditions include sufficient oxygen in the 
atmosphere, but not otherwise. Regarding (3), how much difference a cause makes 
depends on what we are comparing it to. The difference made by a substitute in a 
sports team, for instance, depends critically not just on the substitute but also on 
which player they are replacing.
Combining (2) and (3) above, for any given cause-effect type pair there will 
therefore be many associated token causal strengths—a new one for every change of 
background conditions or xC. In a phrase, any CS is context-specific. No cause has a 
univocal strength simpliciter. Rather, as background conditions or choice of xC vary, 
the very same cause X may have a different strength even with respect to the same 
effect Y.
Stated baldly like this, the context-specificity thesis perhaps seems so obvious 
as to be uninteresting. Yet this feature of CS turns out to have several significant 
implications. One, for instance, is the familiar problem of extrapolation between 
populations. Any population-level CS is relativized to a particular population 
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(formally, to a particular xA, xC and value of W), so there is no guarantee that the 
same CS will be true also of some new population. Knowledge of the underlying 
causal structure will, of course, be relevant to determining whether the CS value can 
indeed be so extrapolated.
Other implications of context-specificity seem to be less widely recognized. I 
survey several of these now. (Northcott 2008a covers some of the same ground in 
more detail.)
7.4.2.  nonadditive causal interaction
Consider a fictional example, simplified for illustration. Suppose that, statistically, 
graduating from college has a certain impact on earnings for whites—say, it in-
creases it by four units (in comparison to finishing education before college). For 
blacks, on the other hand, college raises earnings by only one unit. In other words, 
race and education interact nonadditively, as summarized below:
No college College
Black 2 3
White 3 7
What is the CS of college education here? There is no univocal answer. It is four 
units for whites, one unit for blacks, and presumably some weighted average of 
those two numbers for the population as a whole (assuming both that there are no 
other races in the population, and that the figures in the table are good proxies for 
the counterfactuals relevant to CS calculations). Moreover, the same is true for the 
CS of race, which may be either one unit or four. That is, being white rather than 
black increases earnings by a different amount, depending on whether one has a 
college education. This lack of univocality follows directly from the context-speci-
ficity of any CS—in general, there is a different CS for every change in background 
conditions.19
Notice an important feature here. Consider the income of a college-educated 
white. The CS of their college-rather-than-no-college education is four units; that of 
their being white rather than black is also four units. These two causal strengths 
therefore add up to more than their total actual earnings of seven units. But there is 
no contradiction here. Neither individual CS is more than the total actual effect. 
Arguably, the adding up to more than the total is just what we should expect—that 
is the very meaning of nonadditivity. It is a mistake to think of a fixed pie of causal 
credit waiting to be divided up between the causes. Rather, it may be that many 
causes simultaneously have a large CS, or that none does. As it were, the total 
amount of pie can vary.20
How does current social scientific practice handle interactive effects? Begin 
with qualitative approaches. First, Braham and Van Hees’s (2009) scheme to define 
nontrivial causal strengths in a deterministic setting is committed to a fixed-pie 
view of causal credit, which is problematic in nonadditive situations, for the reasons 
just noted. (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu’s (2009) scheme, recall, is not applicable 
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to multiple independent causes in the first place.) By contrast, and for all its other 
difficulties, the traditional QCA apparatus of necessary and sufficient conditions 
does take on board nonadditive interaction appropriately. For instance, two inde-
pendently necessary conditions—which is formally a case of positive interaction—
will both be assigned full causal importance by it.21
What of regressions? Often, one of the independent variables in a regression 
equation is an interaction term, precisely in response to the possibility that two 
other independent variables interact nonadditively. As noted earlier, sometimes 
regression estimation can help establish the causal structure from which a CS of 
interest may then be inferred even though the regression coefficients themselves 
typically do not correspond to CS values. The same applies now in the nonadditive 
case. In general, the size of an interactive effect between two causes is the CS of 
both causes together, minus the causal strengths of each cause individually (hence 
is of size three units in our example above, as per note 20). There is no reason to 
suppose the regression coefficient for an interactive term will track this quantity, 
and besides there will in any case be many different values for such an interactive 
effect within a population just as there are many different values for a CS. For the 
purpose of elucidating causal strengths, therefore, inclusion of an interaction term 
is of dubious relevance.
7.4.3.  small causes can be important
At Waterloo, the British fought Napoleon to a standstill; the arrival of the Prussians 
was merely the straw that broke the camel’s back. Is it true that the British contribu-
tion was therefore more causally important? Measurably asymmetric contributions, 
the reasoning runs, imply asymmetric causal importance. But it turns out that this 
is not true in general—even if we do measure the British and Prussian contributions 
in an identical currency of number of soldiers and even if, further, the British 
number was indeed the greater.
To see this, for simplicity assume determinism here. Label: xA = the fighting of 
the British soldiers, as measured by their number; zA = the fighting of the Prussian 
soldiers, as measured by their number. Let the salient contrasts in both cases be zero 
soldiers. Denote Napoleon’s actual defeat by Y = 1, his nondefeat by Y = 0. Finally, 
in line with historical consensus, assume that neither the British nor the Prussians 
could have won the battle alone.
Then, applying formula [1]:
 
 1. CS of the British = the outcome with the British compared to that without 
them = (Y given xA and zA – Y given xC and zA) = 1 – 0 = 1
 2. CS of the Prussians = the outcome with the Prussians compared to that 
without them = (Y given zA and xA – Y given zC and xA) = 1 – 0 = 1 
That is, the British and Prussians are awarded equal causal strengths with respect to 
winning the battle. This is true regardless of the exact number of soldiers each con-
tributed—the calculation would have been unchanged even if the British had ten 
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times as many men as the Prussians. The result follows (in this deterministic case) 
simply from xA and zA’s individual insufficiency and joint sufficiency.
With respect to many other effects, of course, the British would have had far 
greater causal importance because of their far superior numbers. Probably too our 
moral intuitions may be sensitive to such “type” considerations. But with respect to 
this particular effect in these particular circumstances, we have no justification for 
awarding the British any more causal credit than the Prussians. Besides, with respect 
to some other effects, say the army’s German-language competence, it is the Prus-
sians that would be more important. Any CS is a token, sensitive to every change in 
effect variable as well as background conditions.22
One source of confusion is the easy commensurability of the number of British 
and Prussian soldiers. This fools us into thinking that the British must therefore 
somehow have greater CS here. But such commensurability is a red herring: Com-
mensurable or not, the British and Prussian forces were nonetheless equally and 
symmetrically necessary to the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. More generally, 
commensurability can be shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient for asym-
metric attributions of CS (Northcott 2005a).
The take-home message is that even so-called small causes, such as the Prussian 
army at Waterloo, can have big causal strengths. Indeed, more fundamentally, it 
seems to me that what it even means for a cause to be large or small can only be a 
large or small CS. It follows that a cause’s size can only be defined relative to a choice 
of effect variable, not by considering the cause variable in isolation from any explan-
atory context.
7.4.4.  limits versus selections
In the next two subsections, there is space briefly to flag two other common confu-
sions. (See Northcott 2008a for further discussion.) First, a claim often heard, from 
Marxists and others, is that the deep structural factors underpinning history are the 
only truly important ones. For example, Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988) argue 
that the threat available to capitalists of an investment strike, a threat that in the past 
has often been exercised, has constrained the politically possible range of govern-
ment policy throughout postwar Latin America. This underlying structural con-
straint, the thought runs, is thus what really determines policy, not the mere surface 
matter of whichever choice some government then makes from the limited range of 
options still open to it. The background limits are what matter, not the subsequent 
restricted selections.
But it is a mistake to privilege the deep structural factors as necessarily more 
important (again understanding causal importance, here as elsewhere, to be CS as 
defined by [1]). Imagine that there are 30 different policies available—5 radical ones 
and 25 more conventional ones. Suppose that the capitalist threat structure limits 
those available to just the latter 25. Then it seems that a government official’s partic-
ular selection, narrowing the field from 25 to 1, can be more important than the 
threat structure, which narrowed the field merely from 30 to 25.
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All turns on the precise explanandum of interest. Suppose the actual policy 
is a conventional one. Then it may well be that without the threat structure there 
would have been a radical policy, whereas swapping ministers would have 
changed nothing. Thus it is the threat structure—not the particular choice of 
minister—that explains why we have the actual policy rather than a radical one. 
But at the same time, it may well be the particular choice of minister—and not 
the threat structure—that explains why we have the actual policy rather than an 
alternative conventional one. (Northcott 2008a explicates this rather intuitive 
line of reasoning more formally. See also Sober, Wright, and Levine 1992, from 
which the example is adapted.) I discuss the issue—crucial in this example— 
of explanandum-dependence in section 4 below. The point here is that there is 
no general, explanandum-independent sense in which limits are more causally 
important than selections.
7.4.5.  Underlying versus Proximate causes
The second common confusion concerns the relative strengths of underlying and 
proximate causes. In particular, there is no general reason to think the former more 
important. Intuitively, merely being an earlier link on a causal chain does not imply 
also being a more important one (Sober, Wright, and Levine 1992). For example, 
suppose the first link in a chain raises the probability of an effect from 0.1 to 0.2, 
whereas a later link raises it from 0.2 to 0.7. The second cause is clearly the more 
important, as [1] reflects. It is also evident the situation could be reversed just as 
easily. Position on the chain in itself implies nothing.
There is one clear objective asymmetry though: An earlier link on a chain is a 
cause of a later link, but not vice versa. Does this asymmetry imply greater CS for 
the earlier link? The inference is not uncommon. The famous Roman historian 
A.H.M. Jones, for instance, argued in favor of the primacy of barbarian invasions as 
a cause of Rome’s fall by noting that the chief rival suspect—internal decay—was 
itself in part an effect of those invasions (Martin 1989, 65). But this is a red herring. 
Formally, the asymmetry is already reflected by the earlier cause (or rather, its con-
sequences) forming part of the background conditions in the later cause’s CS calcu-
lation, whereas the later cause is completely absent from the earlier cause’s CS 
calculation. But that asymmetry does nothing to negate the central fact that what 
actually matters for CS is only how much a cause raises an effect’s probability at the 
time of that cause’s own occurrence.
Often, a preference for the greater importance of underlying causes reflects a 
focus on a particular kind of explanandum. In particular, if we are interested in 
longer-term or broader-scale effects, then with respect to them indeed an under-
lying cause will often have a higher CS than a shallow proximate one. Perhaps these 
kinds of explananda are more often of theoretical significance, but ultimately this is 
still all interest-relative. For example, if we are interested instead in the precise time 
at which a war broke out, then the war’s short-run proximate triggers may well now 
have a much higher CS than its deeper underlying causes.
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7.5. Explanandum-dependence
Despite its importance, evident in both the preceding subsections, providing a for-
mal account of explanandum-dependence is a notable lacuna in the philosophical 
literature. Among the few even to emphasize it in this context are Sober, Wright, and 
Levine (1992), Martin (1989) and Miller (1987). Rectifying this lacuna turns out to 
have significant consequences for our understanding of what a cause’s explanatory 
importance amounts to. I turn to the issue now.
7.5.1.  roots in the literature
As noted, formula [1] or something like it has a long history in several different lit-
eratures. Yet, notwithstanding this ubiquity, it cannot yet be a complete account of 
degree of causal explanation. The reason is that, at least according to contemporary 
theory, causal explanation is contrastive with respect to both cause and effect. On 
this view, explanation takes the general form:
xA-rather-than-xC explains yA-rather-than-yC
where yA and yC are respectively the actual and contrast values of the effect variable 
Y. The contrastive view dates from Dretske (1972). Notable developments of it 
include Van Fraassen (1980), Garfinkel (1981), Achinstein (1983), Hitchcock (1996), 
and—most influential recently—Woodward (2003). A major advantage of it is that 
its sensitivity to yC enables us, as we will see, to capture explanandum-dependence.
The problem—for everyone—is that formula [1] is insensitive to yC. To be 
sure, “yC” appears in [1], but there it is by definition the value that Y would have 
obtained given xC. The yC that is relevant here, as we will see, is that prespecified 
by an explanandum quite independently of any xC. To avoid confusion, I will 
denote explananda by yA*-rather-than-yC*. Thus, in the asterisk notation, the real 
issue is [1]’s insensitivity to yC*. Rather, [1] incorporates choice of contrast only 
on the cause side (i.e., xC), which is fine for an analysis of causal strength but not 
for one of explanatory strength (‘ES’).23 No one (to my knowledge) has ever 
adapted the full contrastive machinery to the issue of degree of explanation. To 
be clear: yC*-dependence is already standard in theories of causal explanation; 
the problem is its absence from the standard definition of degree of causation/
explanation.
Consider a tragic example: the first dropping of an atomic bomb in war. What 
explains the timing of this event—that is, of the bomb at Hiroshima? Consider two 
causes: the fine weather that day; and Japan’s reluctance to surrender. In accordance 
with contrastive theory, we must also specify respective salient contrasts: bad 
weather that day; Japan amenable to surrender. Here’s the point: Both these causes 
can be argued greatly to have increased the bombing’s probability:
 
 1. If the weather had been bad instead of good, the bombing would have been 
postponed.24
Mechanisms, Explanation, and Causation146
OUP  UNCORRECTED PROOF
KINCAID-Chapter 07-PageProof 146 March 10, 2012 2:36 PM
 2. If Japan had been willing to surrender, Truman would likely have thought 
the bombing unnecessary.
 
But the two causes increase the probability of, so to speak, different aspects of the 
bombing:
 
 1. The weather impacted its precise timing.
 2. The Japanese attitude impacted only its rough timing (or, for those opti-
mists who believe that there might otherwise never have been such an 
event, whether a first atomic bombing occurred at all).
 
Thus the weather is highly explanatory only of the short-term explanandum—
why the first bombing occurred on August 6, 1945 rather than the subsequent few 
days. Japan’s attitude, by contrast, is highly explanatory only of a longer-term 
explanandum—why the first bombing occurred in 1945 rather than some subse-
quent year. Unfortunately, the simple formula [1] is unable to capture this crucial 
distinction. Both the weather and the Japanese attitude made a big difference to 
whether the bomb was dropped, and for this reason both factors score well on [1]. It 
is impossible to represent in [1] the crucial distinction between the long-run and 
short-run explananda, because just specifying the bomb-drop alone (i.e., just yA* 
alone) still leaves unclear which aspect of it is explanatorily relevant.25 We need a 
successor to [1] that is yC*-sensitive.26
Neither is this need of merely theoretical interest. The Hiroshima example illus-
trates its pertinence, as do the issues discussed earlier of underlying versus proximate 
causes and limits versus selections. More widely, the worry is that disputes ostensibly 
about substance often turn out to be cases merely of people talking past each other; or, 
more precisely, cases of people addressing different explananda and thus not really 
being in conflict. Sober, Wright, and Levine (1992, 134) comment in this regard: “A 
problem that constantly befuddles debates about the importance of different causes 
. . . is the correct designation of the object of explanation (the explanandum).” The 
point is that these episodes could be avoided by an explicit specification of the 
explanandum of interest—that is, in our terminology, by a specification of yC* as well 
as of yA*.
7.5.2.  a Definition of Explanatory strength
Generally, providing a formal analysis of ES proves an intricate business. There are 
several categories of cases and many nuances, but there is space here only to give a 
bare-bones account of one kind of case, namely where the effect is a qualitative var-
iable with no quantitative nuance. (See Northcott 2011a for more, including the re-
lation between what previous accounts do exist and the one advanced in this paper.)
To begin, any ES will be a relation between an explanandum and an explanans. 
The sequence of analysis is then as follows:
 
 1. Define a target explanandum yA*-rather-than-yC*, this being specified 
independently of any cause variable X.
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 2. Consider a particular explanans xA-rather-than-xC (i.e., an actual level of 
cause xA) and a contrast level of cause xC.
 3. Define what it means for the change from xC to xA to fully explain that from 
yC* to yA*, then assess to what extent this actually occurs. 
Regarding (3), the phrase “fully explain” deserves explication. So, to be clear: 
The sense of “fully explanatory” I will have in mind is when a cause makes all (rather 
than only some of) the difference with respect to an effect. This is the sense that is 
of critical interest when considering interventions. Moreover, any  difference-making 
view of causal explanation naturally lends support to describing as “fully” explana-
tory any cause that makes all the difference; what else, on a difference-making view, 
could full explanation be?27
More formally then, in the sense just specified, xA-rather-than-xC fully explains 
yA*-rather-than-yC* if and only if the following two conditions are both satisfied: 
 1. pr(yA* /xA & W) = 1 (i.e. yA*) occurs when xA occurs
 2. pr(yC* /xC & W) = 1 (i.e. yC*) would have occurred had xC occurred28 
Our true goal, however, is a measure of partial explanation. We may now define this as 
the degree to which the conditions for full explanation are satisfied. Formally, the ES of 
an explanans xA-rather-than-xC with respect to an explanandum yA*-rather-than-yC* is:
A A C C
pr(y * /x  & W) + pr(y * /x  & W) 
The higher the score the better the explanation, and a maximum score of 2 indicates 
full or perfect explanation. Often, an ES score of 1 is the neutral one indicating no 
explanation at all.29
Like [1] earlier, formula [3] is rather more adaptable than might first appear. In 
particular, it is readily extended to cases where the contrast of interest is a range of 
values. For instance, “why was the budget as much as $2m?” can be represented by 
yC* = the event of a budget under $2m. Other forms of explananda can be accommo-
dated similarly, such as a concern only with ordinal outcomes (yC* = the budget was 
less than the yA* value). Analogous remarks apply also to yA*. That is, the same actual 
event may be described in many ways, possibly impacting the ES score. In this sense, 
ES is description-dependent. Fundamentally, formula [3] is only defined once given 
a prior choice of explanandum, that is, of yA* and yC*. One result of this is the flexi-
bility to encompass many different explanatory concerns about the same actual event.
The relation between ES and the more commonly cited CS is illuminated by 
considering interventions. The CS definition [1], recall, directly tracks the impact of 
these. In particular, it tracks the impact on Y of a change from xC to xA. Things are 
not quite the same with ES. Rather, we can think of ES instead in terms of the desired 
result of an intervention. In particular, ES tracks how well a change from xC to xA 
will yield the desired change from yC* to yA*. That is, CS tracks the impact of an in-
tervention; ES tracks to what extent this impact is the one we want.
We may illustrate the ES formula [3] by applying it to the Hiroshima example. Let:
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yA* = the actual dropping of the Hiroshima bomb
xA = (the occurrence of) fine weather that day, xC = bad weather that day
zA = Japanese reluctance to surrender, zC = Japanese willingness to surrender
Recall the short-term explanandum—that is, why the bomb was dropped exactly 
when it was. This is represented by yC* = the bomb was dropped in the few days after 
August 6, 1945. Intuitively, recall, the fine weather is highly explanatory of this 
whereas the Japanese reluctance to surrender is not. For brevity, simplify here by 
assuming pr(yA* /xA & W) = 1. Then, applying [3]: 
 1. Good weather’s ES = pr(yA* /xA & W) + pr(yC* /xC & W) = 1 + pr(given bad 
weather on 6th August 1945, the bomb would have been dropped in the few 
days after) = (1 + quite high) = (1 + 0.9, say) = 1.9.
 2. Japanese attitude’s ES = pr(yA* /xA & W) + pr(yC* /zC & W) = 1 + pr(given 
Japanese willingness to surrender, the bomb would have been dropped in 
the few days after) = (1 + quite low) = (1 + 0.1, say) = 1.1.30
 
Thus, as desired, the weather but not the Japanese attitude is endorsed as highly 
explanatory.
As is easily shown, the results are reversed for the long-term explanandum: for 
a new yC* = a bomb was first dropped only in subsequent years. Then it is the 
Japanese attitude, but not the weather, that comes out highly explanatory. Of course, 
what matters here is not the exact figures but rather only the general point they il-
lustrate—namely that [3] successfully tracks those factors that determine ES.
Overall, although of course there may be ways of formalizing explanandum-
dependence other than by [3], nothing (to my knowledge) so explicit or quantitative 
has yet appeared in the literature. Meanwhile, being so explicit carries significant ben-
efits: It helps prevent pseudo-disputes in which the participants are unwittingly talking 
past one another. It makes clear the connection to the general philosophical literature 
on causation and explanation. It makes clear the precise roles here of chance,31 counter-
factuals and contrasts. And it also makes clear which aspects of ES are subjective or 
interest-relative (i.e., choice of contrasts, and initial choice of effect variable), and which 
are objective (i.e., background conditions, and the value of ES once given Y, yC* and xC). 
It reveals a range of often overlooked features, namely those discussed with reference 
to CS in section 3. Further benefits, discussed in Northcott (2011a), include: clarity re-
garding the relation between qualitative and quantitative cases; a general account of 
explanatory relevance; and, depending on one’s wider metaphysical commitments, also 
some light shed on the relation between causation and causal explanation.
7.6. conclusion
Formula [1], I have argued, represents our philosophically best-supported measure 
of degree of causation, one accepted and adopted, implicitly or explicitly, across 
many sciences. Yet methods widespread in social science conform with it only very 
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imperfectly. In particular, except in unusually favorable circumstances, regression 
coefficients do not track meaningful CS scores, even when the regression equation 
represents the causal structure truly. Current qualitative methods are also ill suited 
to estimating CS scores in all but deterministic cases. Moreover, if our focus is on 
degree of explanation rather than degree of causal effect, then we must also take into 
account the exact specification of the explanandum, yet no current formal tech-
nique does so.
On a more positive note, we can do our best to establish the information that 
[1] tells us is necessary for estimating any CS score. In particular, we need a good 
estimate of the relevant counterfactual term, which in turn requires a specification 
of the relevant cause-contrast and background conditions. Sometimes, as noted in 
section 2, estimating regression equations may be indirectly useful for this pur-
pose. Meanwhile, if we are interested further in degree of explanation then, as for-
mulated by [3] for instance, we need in addition to be explicit about the target 
explanandum too.
notEs
 1. Notable pioneers in the field include: Good (1961), Holland (1986), Miller (1987), 
Sober (1988), Martin (1989), Sober, Wright, and Levine (1992), Strevens (2000), Pearl 
(2000), Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000), and Hitchcock and Woodward (2003). See 
also Northcott (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2008a, 2008b).
 2. In causal graph terms, there are arrows into Y from both X and W.
 3. For ease of exposition, as well as using yA, xC etc., to denote particular values of a 
variable, throughout I will also use them to denote particular events that instantiate those 
values.
 4. Often, as with temperature or price level, the absence of a cause may make little 
sense. Rather, in such cases we are interested in the impact of a cause relative to some 
specific alternative. Thus in its right-hand term, [1] cites the general formulation xC rather 
than absence of X or some such.
 5. Strictly speaking, in fact the background conditions do vary across the formula 
because as well as impacting Y, in general a change from xC to xA will also impact W too. 
But for our purposes we may ignore that wrinkle, so long as any change in W is only a 
consequence of the change in X. The point is that conditioning on W eliminates spurious 
correlations.
 6. If the relevant counterfactuals are vague or indeterminate, then so too will be the 
corresponding CS. Generally, I do not endorse any particular semantics for counterfactuals 
here, as the salient locus of philosophical dispute lies elsewhere. See Reiss, Chapter 8, for 
further discussion of counterfactuals.
 7. Much recent philosophical and psychological work has focused on the related 
issues of why we tend to pick out one or other counterfactual dependency among several as 
marking “the” cause (Hitchcock and Knobe 2009), or more broadly on why some depen-
dencies tend to be judged “causal” more easily than are others (Woodward 2006).
 8. I take the probabilities here to be objective single-case chances (and the relevant 
expected values to be derived from the distributions of such chances). See note 28 below 
for further discussion.
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 9. I express no opinion on the further metaphysical issue of whether that uncertainty 
in turn results merely from the coarse-grainedness of such specifications, or in addition 
from the world itself ultimately being indeterministic all the way down.
 10. QCA is not the only possible qualitative approach, however. The alternatives need 
not be committed to the same deterministic framing, and accordingly may furnish 
nontrivial causal strengths. I have in mind detailed narrative or historical investigations of 
single cases, including process tracing (see David Waldner’s chapter in this volume). See 
also the mention of fuzzy sets below.
 11. Tellingly, the only quantitative examples considered in their paper feature critical 
thresholds, so that an effect only ever occurs all-or-nothing, that is, without any possibility 
of quantitative nuance.
 12. Because my focus is on conceptual rather than inferential issues, I pass over here 
consideration of the error term or of how well b might have been estimated. (I also do not 
consider here the important question of how X and Y might best be defined and measured 
in the first place.) Instead, the issue will be: assuming b has been estimated correctly, would 
it then give the value of X’s causal strength?
 13. I am glossing over various technical estimation issues here. Several different 
formulations of [2] are possible, although all share the same basic difference-making idea 
(Morgan and Winship 2007, 42–50).
 14. An analogous problem afflicts the use of analysis of variance here (Lewontin 1974, 
Northcott 2008b).
 15. In principle, stratification techniques could yield a separate regression 
coefficient for each pair of X values. But in practice, this is rarely done—or even feasible 
if, for instance, X is continuous. Moreover, in general there will be many different data 
points for any given X value, rendering even the fine-grained CS an average over many 
cases.
 16. A separate issue concerns the appropriate counterfactual term in each CS calcula-
tion. For instance, if xC = 1, should we assess the value of Y using the actual data point for X 
= 1, or the value of Y calculated from the underlying function, i.e., now ignoring the error 
term component to the actual value of Y? I do not address that choice here, but the latter 
option would mean that a regression coefficient might after all capture a univocal CS, as 
per the next paragraph in the text.
 17. Although even this rosy scenario requires in addition that the X-variable is such 
that one unit of it makes sense. For example, if X represents discrete political parties or 
policy options, then a one-unit change in X will have no meaning.
 18. One disanalogy between the two traditions is that the distinction between 
individual- and population-level causal strengths is not important in the qualitative case. 
As noted, the goal in the latter is to outline a causal structure that applies only to (every 
member of) a particular prespecified small-N population.
 19. Notice, therefore, that the presence of nonadditive interaction in no way renders 
causal strengths somehow incalculable or ill defined. Rather, it simply emphasizes that the 
same cause-effect pair can have a different CS for every change in W.
 20. Neither is it feasible to define each individual cause’s credit minimally, allocating 
the rest of the credit to a joint interactive effect. (In the example in the text, for instance, 
that would imply giving race and education one unit of credit each for the college-educated 
white’s income, and a joint interactive effect the credit for the remaining three units [above 
the baseline outcome of two].) There is no space here for a full discussion of why not but, 
briefly, it turns out that the amount allocated to interactive effects would then depend 
unacceptably on the arbitrary choice of which causes are foregrounded for our attention 
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(Northcott 2011b). Further, in effect the approach commits itself to the untenable position 
that each individual cause has a unique context-independent CS.
 21. Note though a further implication of [1], which is that merely being necessary is not 
sufficient for full CS, contrary not just to QCA but also to several suggestions in the philosophy 
of history literature (Northcott 2008a). For instance, a cause might raise an effect’s probability 
from 0 to 0.1, thereby making it necessary, but nevertheless of much less importance than a 
second cause that although unnecessary raises the effect’s probability from 0.1 to 0.9.
 22. Braham and van Hees (2009) endorse asymmetric causal strengths in some voting 
games analogous to the Waterloo example. But I see their reasoning as involving unwarranted 
appeal to various type considerations.
 23. Explanatory strength, or near-synonyms such as explanatory power, has also been 
used to refer to many other things, such as an explanation’s range, robustness, or degree of 
integration with wider theory. Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010) provide a useful taxonomy, 
although they discuss CS only very briefly. They do also mention the issue of explanandum-
dependence but give no analysis of it.
 24. In fact, bad weather at Hiroshima would likely have led to the mission being 
diverted to a target where the weather was better. So we must interpret bad weather here to 
cover, say, every other sizeable Japanese city too.
 25. Neither, it turns out, can this problem be overcome simply by judicious choice of 
Y-variable (Northcott 2011a).
 26. In general, it also proves problematic that [1] is defined in terms of yA rather than 
yA* (Northcott 2011a).
 27. Therefore I am not concerned here with explanations that are partial in the sense of 
specifying only one cause out of the many that determine any given event. On this latter view, 
full explanation would apply only when we had an accurate description of all an event’s causes. 
But this seems pointlessly to insist on an unattainable perfection and in practice would render 
no explanation anything other than partial. For instance, that a match was struck seems fully 
explanatory of that match being alight, without also insisting on the details of the friction 
between match-head and surface, or of why I chose to strike the match, or of every necessary 
background condition such as oxygen in the atmosphere, the match not being wet, and so forth.
 28. “pr()” here denotes probability. As noted in note 8, these probabilities are to be 
conceived as objective single-case chances. Such chances are, of course, philosophically 
controversial, and taking them to be the effect variables deviates from usual practice in the 
causal modeling literature. In defense: In practice, they are invoked ubiquitously in many 
sciences but it does not seem common that actual disputes turn on disputes about partic-
ular evaluations of them. Besides, of course, other accounts of the metaphysics of proba-
bility have their own difficulties too. At any rate, such chances seem to be a presupposition 
of many claims of CS and ES. If their value really is crucially unclear in any particular case, 
then so will be the associated CS or ES.
I do not endorse here any particular account of objective chance. The goal is only to 
explicate ES once given the probabilities in an explanandum and explanans, not to explicate 
those probabilities’ underlying metaphysics. See Abrams (chapter 9 in this volume) for an 
account of objective chance applied to the social sciences.
 29. An example may help intuition: Suppose we want to explain yA* = the water in a cup 
is liquid, rather than yC* = it is not liquid. Consider an obviously irrelevant explanans, say 
xA = I won a game of tennis this morning, rather than xC = I lost it. Then ES = pr(yA* /xA & 
W) + pr(yC* /xC & W) = 1 + 0 = 1. In other words, 1 is exactly that ES score achieved by the 
irrelevant explanans, and thus is the “neutral” score. (See Northcott 2011a for fuller 
discussion.)
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 30. Strictly, the composition of W is not constant here across each term, as sometimes 
it will incorporate the value of X and sometimes that of Z instead. But the main point goes 
through regardless.
 31. For more on [3]’s treatment of indeterminism, see Northcott 2011a.
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